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ABSTRACT
This paper examined six corporate governance variables which are hypothesized to have an influence on firm’s financial 
performance in Malaysia. The variables encompassed four internal monitoring measures (CEO and chairman of the 
board, non-executive directors, audit committee and concentrated ownership) with the remaining two variables being 
external measures (institutional investors and lenders). An empirical study was conducted based on data involving 420 
Malaysian listed companies over a four-year period from 2009 to 2012. A combination of cross-sectional and time-series 
data was employed in the analysis. An econometric model using panel data regression techniques was employed to analyse 
performance of the firms using both fixed effects and random effects models. Using return on equity as the dependent 
variable, it was established that CEO duality (an internal monitoring measure) significantly influences the performance of 
firms. The study showed that a CEO who is also chairman of the board exerts a positive influence on company earnings. 
It suggests that CEO duality could increase performance of firms when these CEOs dominate the decision-making process 
in their companies. None of the other monitoring measures relating to independent directors, institutional investors, 
ownership structures, audit committee and banks played any role in influencing firm performance.
Keywords: CEO duality; corporate governance; board practices; independent directors; institutional investors; ownership 
structures; audit committee; firm performance
INTRODUCTION
The focus on corporate governance has risen dramatically 
over the last two decades. This is due to a host of high-
profile corporate scandals that have shaken up the 
corporate world, the most recent ones being related to 
the global financial crisis (e.g. Bear Stearns, Lehman 
Brothers). These corporate collapses have put a 
greater emphasis on the importance of good corporate 
governance; the painful consequences are highly 
visible to the general public. In Asia, poor governance 
standards in both corporate entities and government 
were partly blamed for the East Asian financial crisis. 
In Asia, corporations tend to follow the ‘insider’ model 
with dominant control by owners and large shareholders 
(Sycip 1998; Yamazawa 1998). The erosion of investors’ 
confidence has been identified as one of the major factors 
that exacerbated the financial turmoil in Malaysia and 
a number of Asian countries. Many commentators, for 
example, Noordin (1999) argued that the erosion of 
investors’ confidence in Malaysia is brought upon by the 
country’s poor corporate governance standards and lack 
of transparency in the financial system. 
 The paper examined whether certain corporate 
governance variables have an impact on firm performance. 
Six corporate structures and practices were examined 
to determine if they have any effect on a company’s 
performance. There are four internal monitoring 
mechanisms, namely; the CEO duality issue, the 
governance role of independent directors, concentrated 
ownership structure, and governance role of audit 
committees; and two external monitoring mechanisms 
(governance role of institutional investors and lenders 
in corporate governance). The paper concludes with a 
discussion of some theoretical and practical implications 
from the results of an empirical study of governance 
structures in Malaysia.
MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY AND ITS CONTRIBUTION
The objective of the study was to find out if certain 
corporate governance practises can contribute significantly 
to firm performance. An econometric model was used 
in identifying and analysing variables that can affect a 
firm’s profitability. The findings of this study provides 
empirical evidence lending support to the espousal of 
good corporate governance practises as prescribed by the 
Cadbury Committee (1992) and subsequent revisions. 
There are theoretical and practical implications arising 
from this study and its finding adds on to the existing 
body of knowledge on corporate governance practises in 
Malaysia.
 Another contribution is that this paper examined the 
guidelines on CEO duality as stipulated by the Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance (revised 2012). It also 
discussed its relevance to the situation in Malaysia; bearing 
in mind that the Malaysian code draws heavily on UK 
experience.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
THE CEO DUALITY ISSUE
In Great Britain, more than 70% of the major British 
public companies do not have a duality structure, i.e. the 
chairperson is not the CEO (Lorsch and Lipton 1993). In 
these British companies, a non-executive outside director 
is the chairperson. The chairperson sets the agenda for 
the board and presides at the meetings of the board and of 
shareholders. Frequently, the chairperson speaks for the 
company while the CEO manages the company.
 In the United States, the opposite approach prevails. 
Less than 20% of U.S. companies have a separate 
chairperson and CEO. The vast majority of U.S. chief 
executives opposed the separation of the two roles on the 
grounds that: (1) it would dilute their power to provide 
effective leadership of the company; (2) it creates the 
potential for rivalry between the chairperson and the CEO, 
leading to compromise rather than decisiveness; (3) the 
chairperson may be overly protective of the CEO and shield 
the CEO from being held accountable by the board for poor 
performance; and (4) having two public spokespersons 
leads to confusion and the opportunity for third parties to 
take advantage of the division. In many US companies, 
strong CEO defines ethical values of the firm and becomes 
the framework of corporate governance on which the board 
acts (Patnaik & Sahoo 2010).
 In Malaysia, the number of companies with role 
duality had increased from 17% in 1996 to 30% in 2000, 
and the mean for the five-year period was 26%, indicating 
that role duality is not common in Malaysian companies 
(Haniffa & Hudaib 2006).
 The issue of whether or not the roles of Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the board of directors 
should reside in one person has been addressed from 
two contrasting perspectives (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & 
Johnson 1998). Proponents of CEO duality generally draw 
upon stewardship theory to substantiate their claim in 
favour of the joint structure. It is argued that such unified 
firm leadership will facilitate superior firm performance as 
it removes any internal or external ambiguity concerning 
who is responsible for firm’s processes and outcomes, 
eliminates the possibility of dysfunctional conflict and 
power struggles between the CEO and board Chair, and 
avoids having two public spokespersons addressing 
stakeholders (Conger & Lawler 2009; Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand & Johnson 1998). However, while CEO duality 
is a common phenomenon in companies, its desirability 
is often question. Emanating from the agency theory, CEO 
duality has often been considered problematic since the 
CEO simultaneously acts as the Chairman of the board, 
resulting in a situation where it is very difficult for the board 
of directors to properly monitor the top management’s 
performance and to operate independently. The risk of 
managerial dominance of the board and the firm is thus 
argued to be mitigated by the separation of both positions 
(Conger & Lawler 2009).
There is evidence to suggest that leaders matter most when 
ownership and governance structures correspond with a 
weak or ambiguous institutional logic (Clark, Murphy 
& Singer 2014). Their study contributes new insight into 
the ‘opportunity structure’ of CEO influence, that is, the 
organisational factors that shape leader discretion; and, 
hence, the CEO’s level of influence over firm performance.
THE ROLE OF LENDERS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The role of lenders as a force in corporate governance has 
not yet been extensively analyzed (Prigge 1998). Lenders 
are interested in the repayment of a credit in accordance 
to the credit contract. Since management’s actions are 
one of the factors determining repayment, lenders may be 
motivated to carry out monitoring. Billimoria (1997) found 
evidence to indicate that CEOs of highly leveraged firms 
have less long-term pay. Using three criteria, namely total 
voting power at the general meeting, chairmanship on the 
supervisory board, and liabilities owed to banks (data from 
1990-1992), Perlitz and Seger (1994) segregated a sample 
of 110 listed industry companies into one group in which 
banks have a great potential influence (58 companies) 
and one group in which banks only have a small potential 
influence (52 companies). They found a significant 
difference between both categories: companies of the first 
group show a significantly lower profitability and growth; 
suggesting that bank influences lead companies to take 
less risk and therefore performed poorly. In this study, the 
governance role of banks has been negative.
 On the other hand, Cable (1985) and Nibler (1995) 
discovered a positive relationship. Cable (1985) found a 
positive relationship between bankers’ supervisory board 
membership and company performance. On the other hand, 
Chirinko and Elston (1996), using the same criterion for 
potential bank influence, did not find a relation. However, 
a Malaysian study by Borhanuddin and Pok (2011) found 
a significant relationship between cash holdings and 
leverage; suggesting that companies with good corporate 
governance normally hold cash at much lower level than 
companies that have poor governance structures.
Overall, these studies gave mixed results and did not clearly 
indicate that bankers can perform a value-enhancing role.
THE GOVERNANCE ROLE OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
In Malaysia, studies by Abidin, Kamal and Jusoff 
(2009) and Ramli, Nawawi and Ameer (2010) found a 
positive correlation between board composition and firm 
performance. A study by Ramli et al. (2010) suggested that 
a critical mass of outside directors is crucial to achieve 
board independence, thus improving firm performance. 
However, another Malaysian study by Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) found otherwise; suggesting that boards 
dominated by non-executive directors have no effect on 
firm performance.
 Byrd and Hickman (1992) reported that bidders of 
tender offers with majority-independent boards earned 
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roughly zero stock price returns on average, while bidders 
without such boards suffered statistically significant losses 
of 1.8% on average. You, Caves, Smith & Henry (1986) 
also reported a significant negative correlation between 
proportion of inside directors and bidder stock price 
returns. This suggests that independent directors may help 
to restrain the CEO’s tendency to build a larger empire, even 
if this means overpaying to buy another company. Denis 
and Sarin (1997) reported that firms that substantially 
increased the proportion of independent directors had 
above-average stock price returns in the previous year. In 
a study to assess investor reaction to the appointment of 
additional directors, Rosenstein & Wyatt (1990) found that 
stock prices increased by about 0.2% on average, when 
companies appointed additional outside directors. This 
increase is statistically significant, but economically small. 
THE GOVERNANCE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
Large outside (institutional) shareholders are regarded as an 
effective monitoring mechanism since they have a vested 
interest in minimizing any asymmetry of information 
which may exist and will therefore vote in accordance to 
their own interests (Jarrell & Poulson 1987). In addition 
to the monitoring role, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) also 
argued that large outside shareholders assist the market 
for corporate control simply by being willing to sell their 
shares should an appropriate bid be made. They, therefore 
have an incentive to monitor the behavior of managers 
which should solve the free-rider problem identified by 
Grossman and Hart (1980). 
 A Malaysian study by Wahab, How and Verhoeven 
(2008) suggested a positive and significant relationship 
between institutional ownership and corporate governance, 
i.e. an improvement in corporate governance leads to an 
increase in institutional ownership. The positive effect 
of institutional investors is that it can lead to an increase 
in the company’s share price. Institutional investors are 
professionals who put a premium value on companies with 
good corporate governance practices.
THE CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
In regard to the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance, empirical results in 
the U.S. are inconclusive. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found 
no significant correlation between ownership concentration 
and profit rates for 511 large corporations. Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) reported a piecewise linear 
relationship of Tobin’s Q with board member ownership 
for 371 Fortune 500 firms, and also found evidence of 
an inverted “U”-shaped relationship between the degree 
of ownership concentration and profitability. The study 
suggested that there is an optimal level of ownership; and 
that high concentration of ownership is counter-productive 
to achieve better performance. Stulz (1988) demonstrated 
that high managerial ownership can insulate managers 
from external takeover, and by allowing managers to block 
takeover bids, firm value could be lower. Using U.S. data, 
Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990, 1995), 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), and Holderness, Kroszner 
and Sheehan (1999) found that firm value raises with low 
level of managerial ownership and fall with high level of 
managerial ownership. 
 In Malaysia, ownership structures as represented by 
directors, foreign and government ownership have no 
impact on corporate performance (Ghazali 2010; Abidin, 
Kamal & Jusoff 2009). However, another Malaysia study 
by Tam and Tan (2007) found otherwise; their study 
suggested that types of ownership have a direct impact 
on firm performance. They also argued that Malaysia’s 
financial system fails to provide adequate signalling effect; 
and therefore, could not provide effective monitoring role 
over management.
THE GOVERNANCE ROLE OF AUDIT COMMITTEES
Several empirical studies on the impact of audit committees 
on firm value gave mixed results. A study by Aldamen, 
Duncan, Kelly, McNamara, and Nagel (2011) found that 
during the recent global financial crisis, financial expertise 
and external directorships of audit committees were 
positively associated with firm performance. However, 
Brick and Chidambaran (2010) recorded a negative impact 
of the monitoring activity of audit committees on firm 
value for the sample as a whole. Another study by Henry 
(2008) indicated that internal governance factors (i.e. 
the existence of an audit committee) do not substantially 
impact firm value.
 Several studies documented that the presence of an 
audit committee is associated with fewer incidences of 
financial reporting problems. A study by Sun, Wei, and 
Xu (2012) found that accounting, finance and insurance 
financial expertise in audit committees are associated with 
more accurate loss reserve estimates. Similarly, Lary and 
Taylor found that audit committees independence and 
financial expertise are significantly related to a lower 
incidence of financial re-statements (i.e. the annual reports 
are more accurate). Also, a study by Lo et al. (2010) showed 
that firms with high board independence and financial 
experts on their audit committees are less likely to engage 
in transfer pricing manipulations.
MONITORING MEASURES AND HYPOTHESES FORMULATION
Six measures of monitoring were used in this study; and 
divided into two types: internal or external monitoring 
measures. Consequently, hypotheses were formulated to 
examine the two types of monitoring measures.
INTERNAL MONITORING MEASURES
The first internal monitoring measure is the ratio of the 
number of outside (non-executive) directors to total 
directors (i.e. inside and outside directors), a measure 
commonly used by researchers to measure corporate 
control (e.g. Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988; Weisbach 
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1988; Beatty & Zajac 1994). The second internal 
monitoring measure is the dichotomous CEO/chairman 
variable, indicating whether the CEO position is separated 
from the chairman of the board. The third internal 
monitoring measure is the presence of an independent 
audit committee which is expected to provide advice and 
monitor firm performance. The fourth monitoring measure 
is the presence of concentrated ownership which by virtue 
of their large shareholdings will increase their monitoring 
as their proportion of share capital increases. Therefore, 
it is hypothesized that:
H1a: a firm’s financial performance will be positively 
related to the representation of non-executive 
directors on the board.
H1b: a firm’s financial performance will be positively 
related to a strong leadership structure (CEO duality).
H1c: a firm’s financial performance will be positively 
related to the presence of an independent audit 
committee chairman.
H1d: a firm’s financial performance will be positively 
related to the presence of large shareholders.
EXTERNAL MONITORING MEASURES
The first external monitoring measure is the presence of 
large creditors, i.e. bank debt. Banks are expected to use 
their influence as lenders to monitor management in order 
to ensure repayment of their principal and interest in the 
future. The second monitoring measure is the presence of 
a shareholder with large equity holdings (greater than 5%) 
that is not on the board (i.e. a blockholder or institutional 
investors). Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
H2a: a firm’s financial performance will be positively 
related to the presence of large creditors (banks).
H2b: a firm’s financial performance will be positively 
related to the presence of institutional investors.
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
The data for this study were gathered from 420 Malaysian 
public listed companies during the period from 2009 to 
2012. The period was chosen because complete data were 
not available after that period. The samples were public 
companies fully quoted either on the main board or the 
ACE board of the Malaysia Bourse (Stock Exchange). A 
large majority of the companies selected (87%) comes 
from the main board. The samples covered all sectors 
of the economy. The samples were drawn from twenty 
volumes of the Malaysian Bourse (On Disc) CD-ROM on 
the basis that only companies reporting their four years 
of financial results and disclosing the pertinent corporate 
governance data were selected for this research. The 
sample selected is line with other previous researches on 
this area, e.g. Yeboah-Duah (1993) studied a sample of 210 
Malaysian firms for the period 1984-1991, Mat-Nor, Said 
and Redzuan (1999) used 79 Malaysian firms, Ruhani and 
Sanda (2001) used 112 Malaysian listed firms covering the 
period 1992-1997, Yap (2001) used 69 companies covering 
the period 1995-1999 and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) used 
410 companies, Ghazali (2010) used 87 non-financial 
listed companies and Fooladi, Shukor, Saleh and Jaffar 
(2014) used 400 listed companies. These studies suggest 
that difficulties in obtaining complete data from listed 
companies constrained the inclusion of all companies in 
the stock exchange. Therefore, the sample chosen does 
not only depend on the type of study undertaken, but also 
the timely disclosure of information by these companies.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
This research utilized the commonly used accounting 
measure of performance of public listed companies (PLCs) 
as the dependent variable, namely return on equity (ROE). 
ROE is defined as earnings divided by total ordinary 
shareholders’ fund. The dependent variable is used as 
proxy for firm performance. A high score for the variable 
signifies favourable financial performance.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The independent variables are factors that may influence 
firm performance, and they could potentially have an 
impact on the return on equity (ROE) either positively or 
negatively. Five (5) independent variables were selected. 
They are represented by:
1. NED - measures the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board of directors, expressed as 
a percentage. It is defined as the number of non-
executive directors divided by the total number 
of directors on the board of the company. The 
coefficient’s expected sign is positive, i.e. the higher 
the proportion, the more independent the board is 
in making decisions. This implies better company 
performance, measured by return on equity ratio.
2. CHAIRAC - a binary variable. If the chairman of the 
audit committee is a non-executive director, it is 
coded one, otherwise zero. This serves to test the 
degree of independence of the audit committee. A 
non-executive chairman is expected to contribute to 
a more rigorous regime of monitoring and therefore 
improves performance of the company.
3. CEOCHAR - a binary variable. If the positions of the 
chief executive officer (CEO) and the chairman of the 
board are filled by a single person, the variable has the 
value of one, and zero if they are not. The coefficient’s 
expected sign is positive. This is because a unity of 
command structure can motivate the CEO to strife for 
excellent performance. 
4. INST - measures the proportion of large institutional 
investors. The higher the proportion, the greater is 
the monitoring role of institutional investors. It also 
implies that managers of companies would be under 
pressure to perform to the expectations of institutional 
investors. The coefficient is expected to be positive.
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5. GEAR - measures the proportion of large borrowings. 
It is a gearing ratio and is defined as long-term 
borrowings/debt divided by total shareholders 
ordinary fund plus long-term debt. The coefficient 
is expected to be positive since greater borrowing 
implies that lender/bank will be expected to play a 
greater monitoring role.
6. CONCEN - measures the proportion of concentrated 
ownership. The higher the proportion, the greater 
the monitoring role of large owners. This is in line 
with agency theory which hypothesizes that greater 
ownership would reduce agency costs and hence 
improves performance. The coefficient is expected 
to be positive.
7. SIZE - captures the size of the company in terms of 
turnover. Size is expected to be a positive influence on 
company performance due to greater diversification, 
economies of large scale production and greater access 
to new technology and cheaper sources of funds. The 
coefficient is expected to be positive.
MODEL SPECIFICATION
Most of the literature used univariate and multivariate 
logistic regression analyses, or multiple linear regressions 
to test firm’s value and ownership (Weir 1997). The 
method used in this analysis was the pooled ordinary 
least squares (OLS), applying cross sectional time series 
standard multiple regressions. The econometric model 
formulated is based on return on equity (ROE) as the 
dependent variable. H1 and H2 were tested using the 
following OLS model. The model is formulated as follows:
 ROEt = β1 + β2NED t-1 + β3CHAIRAC t-1 + 
β4CEOCHAR t-1 + β5INST t-1 + β6GEAR t-1 
+ β7CONCEN t-1 + β8LogSIZE t-1 + ei
Where; 
ROE = Return on Equity ratio
NED = Non-Executive Directors
CHAIRAC = Chairman of the Audit Committee
CEOCHAR =  Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of 
the Board
INST = Institutional investors
GEAR = Gearing ratio
CONCEN = Concentrated Ownership
LogSIZE = Logarithm of Size of Firm
ei  = error term
PANEL DATA REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression that was 
done earlier produced relatively low R2 value and low 
Durbin-Watson statistics. An examination of the F-test 
and its P-value clearly indicate that the OLS method is 
not appropriate (Leamer, 1978). This is because the data 
under study is panel data or sometimes referred as pooled 
data and it is consisted of a combination of time series and 
cross-sectional data. Such data require the use of panel 
data regression models in order to obtain meaningful 
results. There are two most frequently used estimation 
techniques to address these problems, namely the fixed 
effects model and the random effects model (Gujarati 
2003). Both models form part of the generalized least 
squares (GLS) method of analysis.
 The data was analyzed by the econometric software, 
Time Series Processor (TSP) version 5. This is one of the 
few software that has the capability of handling panel data 
since the data collected were massive. Only the dependent 
variable is expressed in natural logarithm form. This study 
used panel data as the basis of an empirical analysis to 
determine the complex relationship between corporate 
governance structures and firm performance. Such 
analysis, employing cross sectional and time series data 
generates a large data set that requires new techniques 
or models.
 The advantages of panel data methods, as compared 
to standard estimation techniques include increased 
precision of regression estimates, the ability to control 
for individual effects and to model temporal effects 
without aggregation bias (Greene 2000; Baltagi 2001). 
The underlying assumption is that first order serial 
correlation is addressed by using multiple regression 
techniques (Yermack 1996; Boyd 1995). For this model, 
diagnostic analyses were conducted to check the presence 
of multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. The variance 
inflation factors for the model ranged from 0.998 to 
3.89, i.e. below the threshold of 10, suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not an issue (Gujarati 2003; Hair et 
al. 2006).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
The results in Table 1 show that a majority (87%) of 
companies came from the main board while the ACE 
(second) board comprises 13%. These findings are 
consistent with other Malaysian studies (Ibrahim & Abdul 
Samad 2010; Amran & Ahmad 2013). The vast majority 
of public companies in Malaysia are quoted on the main 
board since they are large companies and benefited from 
higher market liquidity as compared with the less traded 
second board. It is more prestigious to be quoted on the 
main board as investors prefer bigger, blue chip companies 
that are well managed.
TABLE 1. Frequency and percentage of companies 
by type of board
Frequency Percentage
Main board
ACE (Second) board
365
55
87
13
Total 420 100
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 Table 2 summarizes the sector that the companies 
represent. The top three largest sectors are industrial 
products (33.1%), consumer products (24.3%) and 
construction (12.1%). These sectors are representative of 
the Malaysian economy whereby the domination of these 
sectors reflects a dynamic developing country which has 
yet to achieve maturity.
higher than the sample of Amran and Ahmad (2011) with 
the percentage of duality being only 10%. However, it is 
similar to a study by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) whereby 
the percentage is 30%. The duality percentage in this 
sample is still in line with the Malaysian Code on corporate 
governance since a majority of these companies (62%) 
separated the roles of CEO and chairman of the board.
 The mean value of institutional investors is 10.7%. 
This indicates that institutional investors did not own large 
chunks of shares in Malaysian companies. This is expected 
since institutional investors do not wish to be involved in 
company’s management but their shareholding is significant 
enough to be noticed by company management who would 
not wish to chase them away through mismanagement. 
 The mean value of gearing in the sample is 20.4%. 
Thus, indicating these companies’ borrowings were not 
high but manageable; and that there is spare capacity for 
them to borrow further if the need arises. The percentage 
is similar to a study by Amran and Ahmad (2013).
 The mean value for concentrated ownership is 39.5% 
with a minimum ownership level of 4% and maximum of 
96%. This finding revealed a higher level of concentrated 
ownership as compared to a study by Mahmud et al. 
(2010). This indicates prevalence of family controlled 
companies in Malaysia (Amran & Ahmad 2013).
 The mean turnover (size) of companies in the sample 
is RM739 million with a maximum size of RM13,294 
million and a minimum of 0.88 million. This shows that 
most public listed companies in Malaysia are large enough 
to withstand competition domestically and able to employ 
good quality professional managers to improve corporate 
governance practices.
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The results obtained from using GLS techniques were 
obviously better, judging from the statistical significance 
of the estimated coefficients and the high value of R2. The 
Hausman specification test confirmed the superiority of the 
fixed effect models over the random effect models. Hence, 
further interpretative work and discussions only involve 
the fixed effects model. The results are summarized in 
Table 4. Using logged return on equity (LROE) as the 
dependent variable, three significant variables were 
obtained with significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. The 
estimated value of the R2 was 0.688 which implies that 
about 69% of the variation in (logged) earnings could be 
explained jointly by the seven independent variables. The 
TABLE 2. Frequency and percentage of companies 
by industry sectors
Frequency Percentage
Consumer product
Industrial product
Plantation
Trading services
Construction
Infrastructure projects
Technology
Hotels
Properties
102
139
32
38
51
4
12
8
34
24.3
33.1
7.6
9.0
12.1
1.0
2.9
1.9
8.1
Total 420 100
TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics – minimum, maximum, mean and median
ROE NED CHAIRAC CEOCHAR INST GEAR CONCEN SIZE
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Observations
-0.057382
0.06
14.21
-79
1601
65.45636
67
91
14
1601
0.812968
1
1
0
1601
0.376559
0
1
0
1601
10.66491
7
83
0
1601
0.20419
0.13
2.91
-0.38
1601
39.51122
39
96
4
1601
739.8359
225
13294
0.88
1601
 The results in Table 3 show that the mean return on 
equity is negative 0.06% suggesting a tough operating 
environment; i.e. companies were not giving a good return 
to shareholders. However, the variation is very wide with 
a maximum return of 14.2% and a minimum of negative 
79%. 
 In the sample, the mean value for non-executive 
directors is 65%, suggesting that most of these companies 
adhered to the guidelines of the Malaysian Code on 
corporate governance to maintain a majority of board 
members as independent directors who can play a value 
enhancing role on board deliberations. 
 The mean value of the variable CHAIRAC is 0.81, 
indicating that 81% of the chairman of audit committees 
were non-executive directors. The high percentage is in 
line with the Malaysian Code on corporate governance. A 
non-executive chairman of the audit committee contributes 
to a better monitoring of the company accounts through 
liaison with internal and external auditors.
 The mean value of the variable CEOCHAR is 0.376 
– this shows that 37.6% of the CEOs in the sample also 
held the position of chairman of the board, i.e. a duality 
structure whereby decision making is concentrated in one 
person. The percentage of duality in this sample is much 
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LM heteroscedasticity test (0.998) indicated the absence 
of significant heteroscedasticity.
 Table 4 shows that the findings partially support 
hypothesis H1 but not H2. In fact, hypothesis H2a was 
significant but in the opposite direction to the prediction.
 The results show that non-executive directors (H1a) 
did not perform as predicted by the hypothesis. It was 
found that non-executive directors in Malaysia had no 
influence on returns, i.e. profitability of the company. 
It seems that these non-executive directors were not 
independent enough to play a serious monitoring role, and 
the results indicated that they may not be of high calibre 
to contribute significantly to firm performance. The results 
also indicate that even if the non-executive directors 
were a majority on the board, they had not significantly 
influenced ROE, signifying the lack of independence 
which is expected of them (Chang, 2008). The presence 
of non-executive directors was merely likely to fulfil 
the requirements of the Malaysian Code on corporate 
governance and this finding is similar to a study by Amran 
and Ahmad (2011).
 In terms of leadership structure (H1b), it was found 
that CEO duality performed as predicted by the hypothesis 
and this finding is similar to that of a Malaysian study 
by Amran and Ahmad (2011). The estimated coefficient 
for this variable (CEOCHAR) is 0.521. This is statistically 
significant at 5% level, and can be interpreted as: 
everything else constant, companies that have a dominant 
personality (who holds the dual positions of CEO and 
chairman of the board of directors), can improve return on 
equity by 68.37%* i.e. (e0.521 - 1) compared to companies 
that do not combine the two positions. This percentage 
is derived mathematically from the formula (e0.521 - 1) in 
accordance with the interpretation rule when using an 
econometric model. The results indicate that a dominant 
CEO who is also chairman of the board has significant 
influence over company earnings. Since the CEO dominates 
decisions made in the company, he/she is expected to work 
hard to improve earnings.
 The presence of an independent chairman of audit 
committee (H1c) did not give the result predicted in 
the hypothesis. The results show that audit committees 
chairmen who were non-executive directors in these 
companies did not play a significant role in influencing 
ROE. The fact that the chairman of the audit committee is a 
non-executive director has no bearing on performance. The 
same holds also true even if the majority of the committee 
members are non-executive directors. The results are 
similar to the findings of Shamsher and Zulkarnain (2001). 
This can be explained in terms of the committee’s lack of 
independence and skill required from the members (Chang 
2008). 
 It was found that large ownership (H1d) did not 
performed as predicted in the hypothesis. Concentrated 
ownership in these companies has no bearing on company 
performance and the argument that large blockholders align 
their interest with the company appears not to be true in 
Malaysia. This finding is similar to the results obtained 
by Faizah (2002) who investigated similar relationship 
on plantation companies listed in the KLSE. According to 
the agency theory, large blockholders solve the agency 
problems partially and reduce costs. However, since they 
have control rights, they maybe in a better position to 
expropriate company assets and exploit the interest of 
the minority. Therefore, the owner-managers may have 
worked hard to increase earnings but these earnings may 
be used to enrich themselves, resulting in the company’s 
performance remaining unchanged.
TABLE 4. Results of the fixed effects model (FEM) regression analysis using the natural 
logarithm of return on equity (LROE) as the dependent variable
Independent Variable Coefficient T-statistic P-value
NED
CONCEN
SIZE
SIZESQUARED
INST
GEAR
CHAIRAC
CEOCHAR
-0.000
-0.016
0.00
-0.000
0.013
-0.657
-0.236
0.521
-0.058
-1.300
1.503
-1.934
1.070
-4.358
-0.617
2.185
0.954
0.195
0.134
0.054*
0.286
0.000***
0.538
0.030**
R2   0.688*
Adjusted R2  0.518* 
Probability level of significance of the LM heteroscedasticity test  0.998
Probability level of significance that the fixed effect model 
is not superior to the corresponding random effect model 
based on the Hausman specification test (null hypothesis)  0.002* 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.912
Notes:
* denotes statistically significant variables at 10% level.
** denotes statistically significant variables at 5% level.
*** denotes statistically significant variables at 1% level. 
The three statistically significant variables are SIZESQUARED, GEAR and CEOCHAR. Assuming all other things constant, the optimum 
size of company at which returns to equity are maximised is $7,727 million, based on turnover.
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 In terms of external monitoring by banks (H2a), 
the result was significant but in the opposite direction 
of the hypothesis’s prediction. The resulting coefficient 
(of GEAR) is a negative 0.657. The parameter estimate is 
highly significant (at 0.000 level). It can be interpreted 
as: 1% increase in gearing leads to a 0.13% (0.657 by 
0.20) decrease in return on equity, given that the mean 
GEAR is 0.20. Interpretation of the results was derived 
mathematically using the elasticity in the regression 
equation, i.e. the derived value is the coefficient estimate 
multiplied by the mean value of the independent variable. 
In this study, the mean value of GEAR was used.
 In terms of external monitoring by institutional 
investors (H2b), the result did not support the hypothesis. 
It was found that institutional investors did not exert any 
influence on firm performance. The finding in this study 
had been expected as institutional investors in Malaysia are 
not generally known to be actively involved in shareholder 
activism in the companies they had invested (Wahab et al. 
2008). The results indicated that institutional investors are 
not actively exerting their influence through their voting 
power. Most have short-term objectives. Its influence rests 
in its ability to exit en masse (i.e. exit the stock market by 
selling shares in large quantities) and such actions could 
result in a fall in share prices. It seems that the role of 
institutional investors may be limited to monitoring without 
intervention (Jarrell & Poulson 1987).
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
There were major significant findings in this study and 
these finding have some policy implications. Out of the 
seven independent variables that were hypothesized to 
influence return on equity (ROE), three were found to 
have a significant impact on ROE. The three independent 
variables which were found to be significant are (1) the 
dominant role of the CEO and chairman of the board, (2) 
gearing (borrowing) and (3) size of company. The results 
of the latter two variables are expected and in accordance 
with the accounting and finance literature (Billimoria 1997; 
Borhanuddin & Pok 2011). It is expected that gearing or 
borrowing leads to lower profits for the company due to 
the burden of paying interest costs, and bigger companies 
have advantages in terms of economies of scale in their 
operations.
 The existence of a dominant personality where the CEO 
is also the chairman of the board may have a positive effect 
on company performance in Malaysia. The results of the 
econometric analysis supported the stewardship theory and 
opposed the agency theory. Stewardship theory states that 
CEOs are good stewards of their companies and work hard 
to put company interests above their personal interests. 
Stewardship theory holds that a CEO is not an opportunist 
but essentially wants to do a good job, that is, to be a 
good steward to corporate assets (Barney 1990). A duality 
structure provides clear and consistent role expectations 
that empower senior management (Tricker 1994). In such 
a structure, power is concentrated on one person and there 
is no room for doubt as to who has the authority over any 
matter. There is unity of direction and the organization 
will enjoy the benefits of strong command and control. 
On the other hand, agency theory insists that the CEO is 
not to be trusted at taking care of shareholders’ interest; 
and therefore a separate chairman is needed to monitor the 
CEO’s performance and the CEO is to be removed if he/she 
underperforms.
 The results of this study did not resonate with the 
guidelines of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(revised 2012). The guidelines discourage companies from 
combining the roles of chairman and CEO. Whilst there is 
theoretical support for this guideline, the results of this 
study do not support the Malaysian code that the role of 
CEO should be separated from the board chairman. The 
result of the study revealed that separating the two roles 
leads to inferior performance. The Malaysian code follows 
closely the UK Code on Corporate Governance and this is 
based on UK’s experience as set out in the Cadbury Report 
(1992) and the Hampel’s Committee Report on Corporate 
Governance (1997).
 The results from the study indicated that when CEOs 
dominate the decision-making process in the company, 
they tend to work hard to improve firm performance. 
Dominant CEOs are a common phenomenon in a developing 
economy and the results of this study indicate that this 
could bring positive outcomes. Politically savvy CEOs can 
secure profitable government contracts (Noor Azizah & 
Halimah 2007; Gomez & Jomo 1999). This is in line with 
the findings of Clark, Murphy and Singer (2014) whereby 
leaders matter most when ownership and governance 
structures are weak and institutional logic is ambiguous. 
 The result of this study resonates with a Malaysian 
study by Lo, Ramayah, Hii and Songan (2010) and Mohd 
Ghazali (2014). Strong leadership gives effective direction 
giving staff confidence and drives commitment towards 
performance. Their study showed that if supervisors 
maintain a good relationship with subordinates, there is 
greater commitment in achieving organizational goals. 
Similar findings were recorded by Quigley and Hambrick 
(2014) whereby CEOs matter more than ever for U.S. 
companies. Strong CEOs defines corporate governance and 
ethical values of the firm are the driving force behind the 
magical turnaround of Xerox (Patnaik & Sahoo 2010). In 
Xerox, the CEO had to make tough choices but focussed on a 
vision toward generating greater value for shareholders and 
succeeded by establishing sophisticated internal metrics for 
achieving it. In addition, the CEO created value for everyone 
by taking steps to raise customers’ satisfaction; motivated 
employees with better remuneration, and contributed more 
to the communities in which it did its business.
 The results relating to gearing (borrowing) can be 
explained as follows: an increase in borrowing burdens 
the companies with interest payments which are directly 
charged to the income statement, thus dampening profits. 
This explains the negative sign for the resulting coefficient. 
However, according to Perlitz and Seger (1994), high 
borrowing encourages the banks and creditors to monitor 
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the company and therefore is expected to contribute to 
higher profits through investments in value enhancing 
projects. The results clearly indicate that this is not the 
case in Malaysia. This is consistent with studies showing 
that banks do not perform such a value-enhancing role 
(Billimoria 1997; Qian & Yeung 2015).
 The significant result relating to size is another 
contribution to the Malaysian corporate literature; 
whereby it provides empirical evidence that company 
size is positively identified with earnings. However, the 
relationship is rather complex as it indicates a parabola 
shaped curve of size over earnings. This is interpreted 
as: the larger the company, the better the earnings, but 
when the company gets too large, earnings will begin to 
suffer. It was found that earnings are maximized at the 
turnover level of RM7, 727 million or about 58% of the 
maximum (turnover) size of RM13, 294 million. The study 
identified the optimum size for which companies can grow. 
Consequently, it proved that even though size matters when 
it comes to earnings, there is a limit, and a corporation 
which has become too large can suffer reduced earnings. 
This can be explained in terms of managers favoring 
empire building at the expense of the productivity of the 
company. It can also indicate the CEO’s inability to exert 
control and his/her lack of technical expertise to run large 
enterprises. The current corporate trend in the USA and 
Europe is to focus on a company’s core business and get rid 
of unrelated businesses of which top managers know very 
little about. The study provided evidence that Malaysian 
companies may have to follow such an example.
REFERENCES
Abidin, Z.Z., Kamal, N.M. & Jusoff, K. 2009. Board structure 
and corporate performance in Malaysia. International Journal 
of Economics and Finance 1(1): 150-164.
Aldamen, H., Duncan, K., Kelly, S., McNamara, R. & Nagel, S. 
2011. Audit committee characteristics and firm performance 
during the global financial crisis. Accounting and Finance, 
Early View. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-629X.2011.00447.x.
Amran, N.A. & Ahmad, A.C. 2011. Board mechanisms and 
Malaysian family companies’ performance. Asian Journal 
of Accounting and Governance 2: 15-26.
Beatty R.P. & Zajac, E.J. 1994. Managerial incentives, monitoring 
and risk bearing: A study of executive compensation, 
ownership and board structure in initial public offerings. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 39: 313-335.
Bilimoria, D .1997. Perspectives on corporate control: 
Implications for CEO compensation. Human Relations 
50(7): 23-52.
Bliss, M.A., Gul, F.A. & Majid, A. 2011. Do political connections 
affect the role of independent audit committees and CEO 
Duality? Some evidence from Malaysian audit pricing. 
Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics 7(2): 
82-98.
Borhanuddin, R.I. & Pok, W.C. 2011. Cash holdings, leverage, 
ownership concentration and board independence: Evidence 
from Malaysia. Malaysia Accounting Review 10(1): 63-88.
Boyd, B. 1995. CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency 
model. Strategic Management Journal 16: 301-312.
Brick, I.E. & Chidambaran, N.K. 2010. Board meetings, 
committee structure, and firm value. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 16: 533-553.
Byrd, J.W & Hickman, K.A. 1992. Do outside directors monitor 
managers? Evidence from tender offer bids. Journal of 
Financial Economics 32: 195-222.
Cable, J. 1985. Capital market information and industrial 
performance: The role of West German Banks. Economic 
Journal 95: 118-32.
Cadbury, A. 1992. Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance (HMSO), Great Britain.
Carcello, J.V. & Neal, T.L. 1999. Audit committee characteristics 
and auditor reporting. University of Tennessee. Working 
paper.
Chang, A. 2008. A survey examining the perceptions of CEOs on 
corporate governance practises in Malaysia. Asian Journal 
of Management 14(1): 18-40.
Baltagi, B. 2001. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. 2nd edition. 
Chichester: John Wiley.
Chirinko, R.S. & Elston, J.A. 1996. Banking relationships in 
Germany: Empirical results and policy implications. Emory 
University.Working Paper
Clark, J.R., Murphy, C. & Singer S.J. 2014. When do leaders 
matter? Ownership, governance and the influence of CEOs 
on firm performance. Leadership Quarterly 25(2): 358-372.
Cohen, S.G. & Bailey D.E. 1997. What makes teams work: Group 
effectiveness research from the shop floor to the executive 
suite. Journal of Management 23(3): 239-290.
Conger, J.A. & Lawler E.E. 2009. Why your board needs a non-
executive chair. In Boardroom Realities: Building Leaders 
Across Your Board, edited by Conger, J.A., 51-84. Jossey-
Bass, San Francisco.
COSO - Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway 
Commission (1999). Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-
1997. An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies, by Mark S. 
Beasley, Joe V. Carcello and Dana R. Hermanson, New York.
Dalton, D.R., Daily C.M., Ellstrand, A.E. & Johnson, J.L. 1998. 
Meta-analysis reviews of board composition, leadership 
structure and financial performance. strategic management 
journal 19(3): 269-290.
Dechow, P.M., Sloan, R.G. & Sweeney, A.P. 1996. Causes and 
consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms 
subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 13 (Spring): 1-36.
Demsetz, H. & Lehn, K. 1985. The structure of corporate 
ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political 
Economy 93(6): 1155-1177.
Denis, D.J. & Sarin, A. 1997. Ownership and board structures in 
publicly traded corporations, working paper.
Donaldson, L. & Davis, J. 1991. Stewardship theory or agency 
theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns. Australian 
Journal of Management 16(1): 49-64. 
Faizah Mohd Shafiff. 2002. Ownership structure and firm 
performance: Evidence from plantation firms listed on Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange. Proceedings of the Third Malaysian 
Finance Association Conference, 2 May, Penang.
Fooladi, M., Shukor, Z.A., Saleh, N.M. & Jaffar, R. 2014. The 
effect of corporate governance and divergence between 
cash flow and control rights on firm performance: Evidence 
from Malaysia. International Journal of Disclosure and 
Governance 11(4): 326-340.
Ghazali, N.A.M. 2010. Ownership structure, corporate governance 
and corporate performance in Malaysia. International Journal 
of Commerce and Management 20(2): 109-119.
64 
Gomez, E.T. & Jomo, K.S. 1999. Malaysia’s Political Economy: 
Politics, Patronage and Profits. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Grossman, S. & Hart, O.D. 1980. Takeover bids, the free-rider 
problem and the theory of the corporation. Bell Journal of 
Economics 11(1): 42-64. 
Greene, W.H. 2000. Economic Analysis. 5th edition. New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall.
Gujarati, D.N. 2003. Basic Econometrics. 4th edition. McGraw-
Hill International.
Hair, J.F., Anderson, R.E., Tatham, R.L. & Black, W.C. 2006. 
Multiple Data Analysis. 6th edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Hampel Report. 1997. Preliminary Report of the UK Committee 
on Corporate Governance. London: Gee.
Haniffa, R. & Hudaib, M. 2006. Corporate governance structure 
and performance of Malaysia listed companies. Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting 33(7&8): 1034-1062.
Henry, D. 2008. Corporate governance structure and the valuation 
of Australian firms: Is there value in ticking the boxes? 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 35: 912–942.
Hermalin, B.E. & Weisbach, M.S. 1991. The effects of board 
composition and direct incentives on firm performance. 
Financial Management 20: 101-112. 
Holderness, C.G., Kroszner, R.S. & Sheehan, D.P. 1999. Were 
the good old days that good? Changes in managerial stock 
ownership since the great depression, Journal of Finance 
54: 435-69. 
Jarrell, G. & Poulson, A. 1987. Shark repellents and stock prices: 
The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980. Journal 
of Financial Economics 17: 127-168. 
Ibrahim, H. & Adbul Samad, F. 2010. Family business in 
emerging markets: The case of Malaysia. African Journal 
of Business Management 4(13): 2586-2595.
Lary, A.K. & Taylor, D.W. 2012. Governance characteristics and 
role effectiveness of audit committees. Managerial Auditing 
Journal 27: 336-354.
Leamer, E.E. 1978. Specification Searches: Adhoc Inference with 
Non-experimental Data. Wiley: New York.
Lo, A.W.Y., Wong, R.M.K. & Firth, M. 2010. Can corporate 
governance deter management from manipulating earnings? 
Evidence from related-party sales transactions in China. 
Journal of Corporate Finance 16: 225-235.
Lo, M-C., T. Ramayah, W.M. Hii & P. Songan. 2010. The 
relationship between leadership styles and organizational 
commitment in Malaysia: role of leader-member exchange. 
Asia Pacific Business Review 16(1-2): 79-103.
Lorsch, J.W. & Lipton, M. 1993. On the Leading Edge: The 
Lead Director (cover story). Harvard Business Review 
71(1): 79-80.
Mahmud, R., Ibrahim, M.K. & Pok, W.C. 2010. Earnings quality, 
managerial ownership and firm performance: Malaysian 
evidence. Paper presented at the AFAANZ conference, 
Christchurch, New Zealand.
Mat-Nor, F., R.M. Said & H. Redzuan.1999. Structure of 
ownership and corporate financial performance: A Malaysian 
case. Malaysian Management Review 34(1&2): 44-48.
McConnell, J.J. & Servaes, H. 1990. Additional evidence on 
equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial 
Economics 27(2): 595-613. 
McConnell, J.J. & Servaes, H. 1995. Equity ownership and 
the two faces of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 39: 
131-57. 
McMullen, D.A. 1996. Audit Committee Performance: An 
Investigation of the Consequences Associated with Audit 
Committees. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 
15(1): 87-103.
Mohd Ghazali, N.A. 2014. Board of directors and performance of 
Malaysian companies. International Journal of Managerial 
and Financial Accounting 6(2): 117-132.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. 1988. Management 
ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. 
Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293-315.
Nibler, M. 1995. Bank Control and Corporate Performance in 
Germany: The Evidence. St. John’s College, Cambridge 
Working Paper No. 48.
Noor Azizah, Z.A. & Halimah, A. 2007. Corporate governance in 
Malaysia: The effect of corporate reforms and state business 
relation in Malaysia. Asian Academy of Management Journal 
12(1): 23-34.
Noordin, Hanafah. 1999. Judicial management to the rescue of 
companies in trouble! Akauntan Nasional, May, 4-5.
Patnaik, R. & Sahoo P.K. 2010. CEO’s legacy to the Board: 
Honesty, resilience or trust? The case of Xerox. The IUP 
Journal of Corporate Governance 9(1&2): 15-26.
Perlitz, M. & Seger, F. 1994. The role of universal banks in 
German corporate governance. Business & The Contemporary 
World 6(4): 49-67.
Pitman, B. 2003. Leading for Value. Harvard Business Review 
81(4): 41-46.
Prigge, S. 1998. A Survey of German Corporate Governance. In 
Comparative Corporate Governance – The State of the Art 
and Emerging Research, edited by Hopt K., H. Kanda, M. 
Roe, E. Wymeersch & Prigge’s, S. U.K: Oxford University 
Press.
Qian, M. & Yeung, B.Y. 2015. Bank financing and corporate 
governance. Journal of Corporate Finance 32: 258-270.
Quigley, T.J. & Hambrick, D.C. 2014. Has the ‘CEO Effect’ 
increased in recent decades? A new explanation for the great 
rise in America’s attention to corporate leaders. Strategic 
Management Journal 36(6): 821-830.
Ramli, F., Nawawi, A. & Ameer, R. 2010. Director independence 
and performance of listed companies: Evidence from 
Malaysia. International Journal of Business Governance 
and Ethics 5(4): 280-300.
Rechner, P.L. & Dalton, D.R. 1989. The impact of CEO as board 
chairperson on corporate performance: Evidence vs. rhetoric. 
Academy of Management Executive 3(2): 141-143.
.  1 9 9 1 .  C E O  d u a l i t y  a n d 
organizational performance: A longitudinal analysis. 
Strategic Management Journal 12: 155-160.
Rosenstein, S. & Wyatt, J.G. 1990. Outside directors, board 
independence and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial 
Economics 26: 175-191.
Ruhani, Ali & A.U. Sanda. 2001. Further Evidence on the 
Relationship between Insider Stock Ownership and Firm 
Performance in Malaysia. Proceedings of the Malaysian 
Finance Association Third Annual Symposium, 26 May, 
IIU, Malaysia.
Shamsher Mohd & Zulkarnain M. Sori. 2001. The Wealth Effect 
on Announcements of Audit Committee Formation, in 
Proceedings of the Asian Academic Accounting Association 
World Conference, Penang, September 2001.
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. 1986. Large shareholders and 
corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 95: 461-88. 
  65
Stulz, R.1988. Managerial control of voting rights: Financing 
policies and the market for corporate control. Journal of 
Financial Economics 20: 25-54. 
Sun, F., Wei, X. & Xu, Y. 2012. Audit committee characteristics 
and loss reserve error. Managerial Auditing Journal 27: 
355-377.
Sycip, W. 1998. The managerial challenge and response to the 
1997/1998 Asian economic crisis. Malaysian Management 
Review 33(2): 1-9.
Tam, O.K. & Tan, M.G. 2007. Ownership, governance and 
firm performance in Malaysia. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 15(2): 208-222.
Wahab, E.A.A., How, J. & Verhoeven, P. 2008. Corporate 
governance and institutional investors: Evidence from 
Malaysia. Asian Academy of Management Journal of 
Accounting and Finance 4(2): 67-90.
Weir, C. 1997. Corporate governance, performance and takeovers: 
An empirical analysis of UK mergers. Applied Economics 
29(11): 1465-1475
Weisbach, M.S. 1988. Outside directors and CEO turnover. 
Journal of Financial Economics 20: 431-460.
Yamazawa, I. 1998. The Asian Economic Crisis and Japan. The 
Developing Economies 36(3): 332-351.
Yap Kiew Heong. 2001. Director Ownership and Financial 
Performance of Listed Companies in Malaysia. Proceedings 
of the Malaysian Finance Association Third Annual 
Symposium, 26 May, IIU, Malaysia.
Yeboah-Duah, K. 1993. Stock ownership and the performance of 
the firm in Malaysia. Capital Market Review 1(2): 83-108.
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with 
a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 
40(2): 185-211.
You, V., Caves, R., Smith, M. & Henry, J. 1986. Mergers and 
bidders, wealth: Managerial and strategic factors. In The 
Economics of Strategic Planning: Essays in Honor of Joel 
Dean, edited by Thomas, III, L. Glenn, 201-221. Lexington.
Allan Chang
School of Business
Open Polytechnic of New Zealand
Private Bag 31914
Lower Hutt 5040
New Zealand
